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I
Introduction
Upon its initial release, the plot was hailed as unique and
imaginative. It was a sharp and insightful look at the pervasiveness of
the modern media, demonstrating that society's fascination with
voyeurism is quickly blurring the line between entertainment and
reality. It was the poignant tale of a simple man, whose life -
unbeknownst to him - was being broadcast around the world as a
television show.'
The story begins with a flashback of the man as an infant, left
without parents He is adopted by a large television network, which
designs a 24-hour-a-day soap opera centered around the boy's life.'
He is placed in an enormous soundstage, the size of a city, filled with
elaborate sets of homes and businesses.4 This world is populated
entirely by professional actors - their sole job being to improvise
scenes whenever they encounter the show's star His wife, his best
friend, neighbors, and co-workers, are all just playing the roles
assigned to them.6 Stores exist only for his benefit. Thousands of
cameras and countless hidden microphones document his every
move.7 Because of the limited size of the soundstage, numerous
efforts are made to restrict his movements to certain areas.8 The
actors are in constant communication with each other and the show's
producers, and at times even talk directly into the camera.' And yet,
our hero knows none of this."' For years, he follows his daily routine
without suspicion." To him, this is real life.
Behind the scenes, manipulating everything that transpires in our
hero's universe, is the show's producer. He is cold-hearted and
egotistical; he has no reservations about exerting full control over his













star's life. 3 In essence, the producer is quite literally playing God - he
determines the story line, decides which characters should be written
in or out of the show, and employs an intricate set of security
measures to maintain the deception of his leading man.' Nothing in
his environment is left to chance. 5 All of this, of course, adds up to
incredible ratings. 6 The show attracts millions of viewers daily, and
becomes a pop culture phenomenon. 7 The producer achieves great
power, the network earns tons of money, and the unwitting star is
propelled to extraordinary fame. 8
Our hero is next seen at age thirty. More and more, he has been
dreaming of what lies outside of the area where his life has been
confined. 9 He has several encounters with people who have broken
through the security measures hoping to reveal the truth to him about
the show (they are part of a growing movement on the outside that
lobbies for his freedom), though he still does not catch on." Then,
slowly, disruptions in his daily routine start to arouse his suspicion.2'
Things begin to go wrong.22 He turns to his best friend to discuss his
concerns, and the producer realizes that a problem is developing.23
Our hero is undergoing significant changes - his naivet6 is replaced
with confidence, and he is gradually becoming aware of the falseness
of his world.24 As his anxiety escalates, he is accused of paranoia and
his "marriage" becomes strained.2 ' His wife even leaves the show.26
He desperately seeks to escape, to leave behind the boundaries that
have constrained him. He longs to see what lies beyond his small
town.28 Some actors genuinely feel for his plight, and try hard to alert
him to the truth; however, the producer fights to maintain control by
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break free - and, with the audience rooting for him, he finally does.3°
With that, television screens go blank, the message "Circumstances
beyond our control" appears, and the show ends.'
No, this is not the plot of The Truman Show.32 It is the story of
Frank's Life," a 1991 play scripted by unknown New York playwright
Mark Dunn. Yet the similarities to the 1998 Jim Carrey film are
undeniable. 4 The basic concept is practically identical. So, when
Dunn reluctantly ventured into a Manhattan theater to see The
Truman Show, he brought a notebook with him to take notes.3 After
watching the film, Dunn was quite upset with what he saw onscreen."
"It makes me feel like nobody's safe from being taken advantage of,"
he later told a reporter.37 In fact, Dunn was so upset, he took his
notebook and its list of similarities uptown, to meet with an
attorney.38
The result was Dunn v. Paramount Pictures: a federal lawsuit
seeking over $300 million in damages.39 Named as defendants were
Paramount Pictures, which released Truman, producer Scott Rudin,
screenwriter Andrew Niccol, as well as Sony Theatre Management,
Inc. and Cineplex Odeon Corp. (which had been exhibiting Truman
in their theater chains)." Dunn asserted six claims for relief: copyright
infringement, breach of an implied-in-fact contract, unlawful
interference with an existing advantageous relationship, breach of
duty to hold in confidence, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and finally, false designation of origin and
unfair competition. The complaint listed 132 alleged similarities
between Dunn's Frank's Life and Paramount's The Truman Show.42
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The Truman Show (Paramount Pictures 1998)(motion picture).
33. Mark Dunn, Frank's Life (Dramatic Publishing 1991)(play).
34. The foregoing synopsis accurately describes the basic story of both works. Only
the message at the end - "Circumstances beyond our control" - serves to identify the plot
as that of the play. The film did, however, contain a similar message ("Technical
difficulties, please stand by").
35. David Usborne, Hollywood Stole My Life, The Independent (London) (Sept. 29,
1998) (available in 1998 WL 16756991).




39. Dunn, Compl. at 25-26.
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id. at 3, 21-24.
42. Id. at 6-19. Several of these allegations were repetitive in nature. For instance:
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Dunn was not the only person who noticed the parallels. Upon seeing
a preview of the film, Susan Shapiro, a theater critic who reviewed
Frank's Life during its 1992 run, assumed Dunn had sold his idea to
"The TV show is a soap opera centered on the life of Frank/Truman"; "Both
Frank/Truman are involved in voyeuristic soap opera shows"; "The lead character
(Frank/Truman) does not know the TV show is taking place"; "Frank/Truman are
unaware that all important persons in their lives (including parents, wives, neighbors, and
employers) are actors"; "Frank/Truman has no real relatives anywhere"; and "There are
no blood relatives of Frank/Truman involved." Id.
However, even with the redundant allegations excluded, there were still an extremely high
number of similarities alleged. They ranged from broad plot points to concrete details, and
also focused on similarities among characters. Here are some examples: "The titles...
carry double meanings. On the surface, both refer to the names of the protagonists.
'Frank' and 'Truman' also refer to the innocence and naivety inherent in the character. In
the Play, Frank's best friend states that he is 'the only honest man [he] knows.' Truman is
said to be a 'true man."'
"Frank/Truman are the leading character in an ongoing TV show"; "Hidden cameras
placed all over the sprawling set and unknown to Frank/Truman"; "The cameras are
capturing Frank/Truman 24 hours per day"; "Frank/Truman taken at age 3/birth from
orphanage/unwanted birth"; "Frank-Shelly/Truman-Meryl are childless"; "Frank/Truman
often think, talk about or try to break free of the boundaries without success, until the end
of the Play/Movie"; "The actors start acting only when Frank/Truman come into their
area"; "An early scene in which Frank put together in a dream all of the persons in
Frank's life assembled abreast, in straight lines, walking toward Frank as a military
phalanx; this dream was copied in Truman when all of the persons in Truman's life
appeared together, walking down the street abreast, in a straight line or lines, as a military
phalanx"; "A specific volcanic island, within a group of such islands or archipelago, in the
southern Pacific Ocean, with double-sounding name (Pago Pago/Fiji), is used as a remote
place at the opposite side of the world from the Show location for persons (Frank/Truman
and Corley-Shelly) to escape from the effects of the Show"; "Producers Christof/Pruett
are similar, calling all the shots, self-centered, cold-hearted, don't care about well-being of
Frank/Truman at all, just putting on a TV show and making money, non-redeemable
character, generating money for network and power/status for himself"; "Actors were
trying to break through the security measures instituted by the Producer and network to
reach Frank/Truman and get them out of the show"; "Both Frank/Truman leave
circumscribed area at end of Show"; "Some cast/crew are rooting for Frank/Truman to
break free/survive"; "Actors can call in security/surveillance, non-actor employees of the
corporation, to deal with actors who are deviating from role, or to deal with
Frank/Truman's efforts to go into prohibited area"; "The lead character (Frank/Truman)
is a male, 30 years old"; "Best friend was in college together with Frank/Truman"; "Both
scenes have actors dropping hints about sister/Sylvia being temporarily insane due to lack
of medication"; "Multiple actors are used to block Frank/Truman escape route, including
putting up of barricades and blocking Frank/Truman from using certain streets"; "Both
works have a flashback to events relating to a school football game in which
Frank/Truman were sideline participants in the game"; "Frank/Truman question his wife
about her claimed professional activities when the wife's explanation was questionable";
"Frank/Truman's wife turns to best friend for help when she has trouble with or worried
about Frank/Truman"; "Frank/Truman is told that pills or other medication or mental
instability are causing actors to say what they do, when trying to tell Frank/Truman that he
is part of a television show"; and "Frank/Truman have no financial difficulties whatsoever,
a matter which is regulated and ensured by the Producer and network, which ensures that
the Show is different from the lives of most of the viewers of the Show." Id.
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Paramount and even called to congratulate him. "I saw the trailer for
the movie and turned to my husband and said, 'I saw this as a play."'43
Dunn claimed that he came up with the idea for Frank's Life in
March 1991, and finished a copyrighted draft of the script by that
November." The play was subsequently performed for three months
during the summer of 1992 in lower Manhattan,45 where it even
enjoyed modest critical acclaim.46 During the play's run, Dunn
submitted the script to Paramount and Fox in hopes of making it into
a film.47 Personnel at both studios reviewed the script, but it was
rejected in August 1992.48 Dunn's agent invited Rudin to come see a
performance of Frank's Life, though it was unclear whether he or any
of his staff actually attended.' 9 The complaint then alleges that Rudin
and Niccol obtained a copy of the play some time between November
1991 and April 1992, and that they also had access to it because of its
New York performances and the submission to Paramount.0 After
reading his script, Dunn charged, Niccol wrote the screenplay that
would become The Truman Show."'
In his defense, Andrew Niccol maintained that Truman was his
own work. 2 He even produced documents that supposedly proved he
had pitched the concept - then titled The Malcolm Show - to his
former manager in May 1991, well before Dunn's play had been
performed or even finished. 3 The treatment read:
Malcolm is the star of a 24-hour continuous soap opera in
the future but doesn't know it. He has been filmed by
hidden cameras every second of his life... "The Malcolm
Show" has been running since his birth. The show has 16
producers, all his family and friends are actors.., all the
strangers that he sees in the street are extras.
Another letter from Niccol, in late June or early July - around
43. Usborne, supra n. 35.
44. Dunn, Compl. at 3.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Usborne, supra n. 35.
47. Dunn, Compl. at 5.
48. Id. at 5-6.
49. Id. at 5; see also Usborne, supra n. 35.
50. Dunn, Compl. at 6, 19, Dunn.
51. Id.
52. Id
53. Benedict Carver, 'Truman' Suit Retort. Pic Origins Precede Dunn Play, Papers
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the time when Dunn submitted his script to Paramount - described
the screenplay as "partially completed."55 Fifteen months later, in
October 1993, Paramount Pictures purchased the rights to Niccol's
The Truman Show for $1.5 million, with Scott Rudin attached to
produce. 6
Despite the existence of these documents, Dunn's attorney Carl
Person was confident about his client's chances for victory:
"Hollywood steals ideas all over the place because it is permitted to,
up to a point ... [but] this is the best copyright infringement case I've
ever seen."57 However, this was not just a copyright case - as Person
said, this case was about stealing ideas.
II
Idea Submissions in Hollywood
Not only did Dunn sue Niccol for writing a script strikingly
similar to his own, but he also accused him of stealing the underlying
concept for the story.5 8 This claim was entirely independent of his
claim for copyright infringement - the theft of ideas is a separate legal
universe. The two areas of law are closely related, but each is distinct
from the other. Each is governed by its own set of rules and doctrines.
Yet, while many are familiar with the basic principles of copyright,
few understand the complexities associated with so-called "idea
submission claims."
Hollywood is no stranger to this kind of litigation. In fact, neither
are Scott Rudin and Paramount. First, in 1990, the studio lost the
famous idea submission case of Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures.
59
Humorist Art Buchwald had written a treatment called King for a
Day, the story of a despotic African sovereign who travels to the
United States."' He ends up stranded in a Washington D.C. ghetto,
penniless and forced to work as a waiter.6 But, he adapts to his new
surroundings, and eventually falls in love with a poor woman who
befriended him. 2 Buchwald entered into a contract with Paramount,
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Barrs, supra n. 36.
58. Dunn, Compl.
59. 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1990) (avail. in 1990 WL
357611); see also Pierce O'Donnell & Dennis McDougal, Fatal Subtraction: The Inside
Story of Buchwald v. Paramount (Doubleday 1996).
60. Id. at *10.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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granting the studio an. option to make his treatment into a film, which
was supposed to star Eddie Murphy.63 However, after the project
spent some time in development, Paramount cancelled the
production abruptly.6 Thus, Buchwald tried to sell his story to
Warner Brothers instead.65 But the Warner Brothers' film never got
off the ground either. A film entitled Coming to America66  produced
by Paramount and starring Eddie Murphy - made it to theaters first.67
Much to Buchwald's surprise, Coming to America shared the same
basic storyline as King for a Day.68 It was the comedic story of an
African prince, who came to the United States in search of a bride.69
He too winds up losing his trappings of royalty, living in a ghetto, and
working in a fast food restaurant, only to find true love.7" Buchwald
sued Paramount for breaching their original contract with him." He
argued that they used his idea without compensating him for it, and
prevailed on that claim.
A few years later, in 1996, Scott Rudin was facing an idea
submission claim of his own. At the center of the dispute was the
origin of the popular film Philadelphia, starring Tom Hanks.73 The
plaintiffs were relatives of Geoffrey Bowers, a Philadelphia attorney
who had died of AIDS a few years earlier.74 He was fired after his law
firm learned of his illness, and he successfully sued for
discrimination.75 His poignant testimony was the trial's emotional
climax, though he passed away shortly afterwards.76 This was precisely
the plot of Philadelphia.7 Bowers lived with his Hispanic lover and
was passionate about opera; the Tom Hanks character likewise had a
63. Id. at *1.
64. Id. at *5.
65. Id. at *6.
66. Coming to America (Paramount Pictures 1988) (motion picture).
67. Buchwald, 1990 WL 357611 at *6.
68. Id. at *11.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *6.
72. Id. at *15. The specific legal issues involved in an idea submission claim will be
taken up in Part III, infra.
73. Philadelphia (TriStar Pictures 1993) (motion picture); see also Cavagnuolo v.
Rudin, 1996 WL79861 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Greg Evans, 'Philadelphia' Story Raises Muddy
Issues in Filmmaking, Variety 11 (Mar. 18,1996).
74. Cavagnuolo, 1996 WL79861 at 3.
75. See Family of Philadelphia Attorney Settles Suit with Makers of Film, Ent. Litig.
Rep. (May 31, 1996).
76. See Evans, supra n. 73.
77. Philadelphia (TriStar Pictures 1993), supra n. 73.
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Hispanic companion and a love for opera.78 Furthermore, the film also
contained specific scenes and dialogue that the Bowers family said
actually happened.79 Essentially, the plaintiffs were contending that
Rudin learned about the details of Bowers' real-life drama in a
meeting with them and then used it as the basis for the film." They
argued that a contract was formed regarding the rights to the story,
and hence they were owed compensation."' However, the case was
never resolved in court. The parties reached a settlement a few days
after the start of trial."
As the Buchwald and Bowers cases demonstrate, idea
submission claims are quite frequent. This should not come as a
surprise. For years, critics have lamented that there are no original
ideas in Hollywood. 83 In fact, one writer suggested that there are only
thirty-six fundamental dramatic situations.84 A journalism professor at
Wake Forest University went even further, claiming there were only
seventeen basic plots; the premise of every film or television show
either fits one of these or is derived from a combination of them.85
Thus, if there are so few ideas to go around, it seems inevitable that
plenty of lawsuits will .be filed claiming them to be stolen.
Before analyzing the law in this area, it is necessary to
understand the general process of how story ideas are received by
producers. Occasionally a producer will come up with an idea on his
own, but this is rare compared to the other methods. 6 Primarily, there
are two paths that an idea can travel on its way towards reaching a
studio - it could be submitted by an agent, or pitched directly by the
writer himself.87 Some writers might be able to gain direct access to
producers, where they would tell their story in hopes of sparking the
78. See supra n. 36.
79. See Evans, supra n. 73; see also Greg Evans and Adam Sandler, TriStar settles
'Philadelphia' suit, Variety 14 (Mar. 25, 1996).
80. See Evans, supra n. 73.
81. Id.
82. See Adams & Sandler, supra n. 79.
83. See e.g. Daniel B. Wood, Hollywood Loves an Original Idea, Christian Sci.
Monitor (available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1997/12/15/us/us.4.html>) (Dec.
15, 1997).
84. See Georges Polti, The Thirty-Six Dramatic Situations (Writer, Inc., 1988)
(1917); see also Henry Albert Phillips, The Universal Plot Catalog (Stanhope Dodge
Publishing Co. 1916).
85. See Steve Duin, The Plots Slowly Thicken, The Oregonian B1 (June 25, 1998).
86. See Stuart K. Kauffman, Motion Pictures, Moral Rights, and the Incentive Theory
of Copyright: The Independent Film Producer as "Author," 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.
749, 779 (1999).
87. Id.
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producer's interest."' Most writers, however, do not have this
opportunity. 9 Producers are busy people, and so will only grant this
kind of direct access to well-established talent.9" Far and away, the
most prevalent form of idea submissions is through the' use of agents.91
The most typical format for an idea submission is a treatment, a
brief synopsis or outline of the story.9" There are practical reasons for
the use of this format. First, producers simply do not have the time to
read many full-length scripts on a regular basis (an average
screenplay is usually around 120 pages long).93 It is much more
efficient for them to see short summaries of story ideas, and then
choose to review only those scripts that seem most interesting.
Second, the use of treatments also benefits the writers. Since
relatively few of their ideas will ultimately be produced, it would be
impractical for writers to complete full scripts for every idea they
think up.94 Rather, it might be easier for them to develop a fairly
detailed treatment or synopsis, which their agent could use to gauge
producers' reactions to the idea. If the response is favorable, they
could then draft or finish their script. If the response is negative, the
writer will at least have conserved a great deal of time and energy -
which could then be spent on developing another idea.
It is important to note one final characteristic of the idea
submission framework in Hollywood. Studios and networks are
constantly inundated with unsolicited idea submissions, sent in by
countless aspiring writers around the country. In order to protect
themselves from lawsuits like those described above, practically every
studio and network refuses to accept unsolicited ideas unless they are
accompanied by a release.9 Most courts have held these releases to be
enforceable. 9 Therefore, if a writer sends in his idea directly instead




91. See generally Richard Walter, The Whole Picture: Strategies for Screenwriting
Success in the New Hollywood 198-214 (Penguin Books, 1997).
92. See generally Chi-Li Wong & Kenneth J. Atchity, Writing Treatments That Sell
(Henry Holt, 1997).
93. "Script Length", Screenwriting.info,
<http://www.screenwritiniz.info/page04.shtml> (last accessed Jan. 30, 2003).
94. For further discussion of the importance of this, see infra Part IV(A).
95. See Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas, Revisited, 1 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 9, 91 n.
336 (citing Robert Kosberg, with Mim Eichler, How to Sell Your Idea to Hollywood 175
(Harper Perennial 1991) ("Any one-line idea submitted without a release will not be read
in Hollywood. Period.")).
96. See e.g. Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461, 467 (1st Cir. 1985).
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before the producer will even read it. If he does not sign a release, his
submission will most likely be returned to him unopened.97 This only
reinforces the notion that agents play a crucial role in the industry, as
the intermediary between writer and producer.
IIl
Current Idea Submission Law
With this general background on how ideas are submitted in
Hollywood, one can explore the many issues of law and policy that
idea submission claims present. First, it is important to understand
that the law concerning idea submission claims is completely separate
and distinct from copyright law.98 Copyright is entirely governed by
federal law, while any protection afforded to ideas must be found in
state law. 9 Copyright law is statutory; idea submission claims have
been created by judges, not legislatures."' The reason for this
separate body of law is simple - idea submission claims developed
because copyright does not protect ideas.1'1 Section 102 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 defines the scope of copyright as extending
only to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression," and explicitly states that "[I]n no case does copyright...
extend to any idea... regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. '" 2 Copyright does
not protect abstract story ideas, but only concrete expressions of
those ideas." This presents a problem for many writers, who submit
their ideas to producers in the form of script treatments and story
outlines, which most often do not qualify for copyright under section
102." Therefore, since it would be unwise for the law to deny
97. See Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he custom in the
television industry is that a studio or producer not desiring any outside submissions states
so explicitly and, when a studio or producer is not interested in reviewing a particular
script, the script is returned unopened.").
98. Copyright claims in the United States are enforced under The Copyright Act of
1976. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2001) [hereinafter The Copyright Act].
99. Id.
100. Compare e.g. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996) with Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299
P.2d 257 (1956).
101. For an insightful overview of the history of the law of ideas, see Sobel, supra n.
95, at 14.
102. See 17 U.S.C. §102.
103. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
104. See Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Circular 47e, Radio and Television
Programs (1973) ("To be acceptable for copyright registration in unpublished form, a
script must be more than an outline or synopsis. It should be ready for presentation or
performance so that a program could actually be produced from the script deposited.").
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protection of their creative efforts altogether,1 5 it became necessary
to develop a new legal mechanism by which to safeguard ideas.
One attempt to create such a mechanism was to classify ideas as
property. California Civil Code section 980 initially provided that the
author of any "product of the mind" retained "exclusive ownership
therein.""' By giving ideas the status of property, the California
statute conferred upon authors a level of protection greater than that
of federal copyright, including the right to exclude others, regardless
of whether or not the idea was fixed in expression."' However, section
980 was specifically amended in 1947 to eliminate property rights in
abstract ideas."l " The California courts made it clear that "ideas are
free as the air, " and by their very nature are not entities that can be
owned and possessed to the exclusion of all others."0 Thus, property
law no longer plays a role in idea protection in California.
Under New York law, however, claims for misappropriation of
ideas based on a property theory are still permitted."' As long as an
idea is "novel" and "concrete,""' 2 then it is "protectible as property." 113
There must also be a certain "legal relationship" (usually a fiduciary
relation or an implied-in-law contractual duty based on unjust
enrichment) existing between the alleged misappropriator and the
writer." 4 If a studio or network uses a writer's story idea, and the
105. See infra Part IV(A).
106. Cal. Civ. Code §980 (West 1982) (Historical Note).
107. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 17; see also Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d
690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950); Kovacs v. Mutual Broad. Sys. Inc., 99 Cal. App. 2d 56, 221 P.2d
108 (1950); Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
108. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 17-18.
109. See Desny, 46 Cal. 2d at 731 (citing International News Serv. v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
110. Id. at 732 ("[I]t is clear that California does not now accord individual property
type protection to abstract ideas.").
111. See e.g. Adsani v. Miller, 1996 WL 194326 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1996); Oasis Music
Inc. v. 900 U.S.A. Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1994); Sellers v. American Broad. Co., 668 F.2d
1207 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying NY law); Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 528 F.
Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
112. E.g. Sellers, 668 F.2d at 1210. The novelty requirement is different for a
misappropriation claim than it is for a contract claim - this requirement will be discussed
in further detail in Part III(B), infra.
113. Murray v. National Broad. Co., 844 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Downey
v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 61, 286 N.E.2d 257, 259, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877
(1972).
114. See McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1985):
In order for an idea to be susceptible to a claim of misappropriation, two
essential elements must be established: the requisite legal relationship must
exist between the parties, and the idea must be novel and concrete. The
legal relationship between the plaintiff and defendant may be either a
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writer can prove these elements, then he may successfully bring a
misappropriation suit."5 This is potentially a powerful remedy against
intellectual theft. However, its practical effectiveness is somewhat
limited. First, the novelty and concreteness requirements imposed by
the New York courts may be difficult obstacles to overcome."6 Also,
if the idea is too concrete, as will be discussed later, the state law
claim may be preempted by federal copyright law."7 Furthermore,
even if the plaintiff can show his idea to be novel and the defendant's
story appears similar, the case will be dismissed if the defendant can
demonstrate that his story was the result of independent creation. '
Hence, despite being a legitimate cause of action in New York,
misappropriation claims are not the primary means of protecting
ideas.
Instead, the most significant legal protection of abstract ideas is
achieved by contract. In many instances, if a writer submits a
treatment or outline that is ineligible for copyright, a breach of
contract lawsuit may be his only option. Even if the idea cannot be
protected by copyright or property law, freedom of contract permits
these types of claims:
The producer and writer should be free to make any
contract they desire to make with reference to the buying of
ideas of the writer; the fact that the producer may later
determine, with a little thinking, that he could have had the
same ideas and could thereby have saved considerable
fiduciary relationship, or based on an express contract, an implied-in-fact
contract, or a quasi-contract.
Since express and implied-in-fact contract claims are usually brought separately from a
misappropriation claim, the "requisite legal relationship" under the property theory is
typically limited to fiduciary relations and quasi-contract. See generally Chandler v. Roach,
156 Cal. App. 2d 435, 440 (1957); Desney v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715 (1956).
115. McGhan, 608 F. Supp. at 284.
116. See Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000);
AEB & Assoc. Design Group, Inc. v. Tonka Corp., 853 F. Supp. 724, 734 (S.D.N.Y..1994)
("In establishing an idea's originality, a plaintiff cannot rest on mere assertions, but must
demonstrate some basis in fact for its claims."); Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 81
N.Y.2d 470 (1993); Educational Sales Programs, Inc. v. Dreyfus Corp., 317 N.Y.S.2d 840,
844 (1970) ([an] idea "must show genuine novelty and invention, and not merely a clever
or useful adaptation of existing knowledge").
117. See generally Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
§ 1.01(B) (1993). Federal preemption of state law claims regarding ideas will be discussed
in depth in Part III-D, infra, at 54.
118. See AEB & Assoc. Design Group, Inc., 853 F. Supp.at 734 ("Even where a
plaintiff's concept is novel and original, recovery will be denied where it is established that
the party alleged to have misappropriated another's concept, arrived on its own initiative
or by wholly independent means at a concept similar to that devised by the party seeking
recovery for misappropriation").
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money for himself, is no defense against the claim of the
writer. This is so even though the material to be purchased is
abstract and unprotected material."9
As with all contract cases, what lies at the heart of the claim is a
broken promise. Essentially, the writer alleges that a producer
expressly or impliedly agreed to compensate him if his story idea was
used. When a subsequent film or television program emerges that is
eerily similar to the writer's idea, he goes to court seeking the
payment owed to him under the contract. To succeed, a plaintiff must
prove all of the familiar elements - mutual assent, consideration, and
breach.' Each of these must now be explored, to better understand
the issues they present within the unique context of idea submission
claims. Finally, the relationship between the law of ideas and
copyright must be examined, to discover when (if at all) it is
appropriate for state law contract claims to be preempted by federal
copyright law.
A. Mutual Assent
Courts have recognized both express and implied-in-fact
contracts for story ideas. Mutual assent, or a "meeting of the minds,"
is required for both types. 2' That is, both parties must manifest an
intent to be bound'22 - the writer promises to deliver his idea, and the
producer promises to compensate the writer if the idea is used. The
difference between express and implied-in-fact contracts lies in the
manner of their formation. To form an express contract, the
agreement must be made in words, either orally or in writing.23 In
idea submission cases, an express contract (especially one in writing)
would clearly afford maximum protection to the writer, since it would
be relatively easy to prove mutual assent. However, as one might
guess, producers in Hollywood are reluctant to enter into express
contracts. Except in some situations concerning established writers,'24
it would be exceedingly rare for a studio executive to explicitly
promise to pay for a story idea.
The existence of an implied-in-fact contract, on the other hand, is
119. See Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 442.
120. See Nadel, 208 F.3d at 376 n. 5.
121. See Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 440; see generally Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 4.13 (1963).
122. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 24 (1981).
123. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 34 (citing Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 260 (1924));
see also supra n. 59.
124. See e.g. supra n. 59. The more common writer, such as Mark Dunn, would have a
difficult time obtaining an express contract for a story idea.
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inferred from the parties' conduct rather than their words.12' The test
for the formation of an implied-in-fact contract for a story idea was
set forth in the landmark decision of Desny v. Wilder.126 Victor Desny
had written a plot for a movie, and wanted to pitch it to producer
Billy Wilder at Paramount Pictures.127 After reducing the story to
synopsis form at the direction of Wilder's secretary, Desny called
back and read his synopsis over the phone.12' He made clear that he
"wanted to sell it," and so Wilder could only use the story if he was
paid "reasonable value for it."'29 The secretary assured him that if his
idea was used, "naturally we will pay you for it."'3 When the film Ace
in the Hole was later released, it closely resembled Desny's idea.'
Demanding the compensation they allegedly agreed to, Desny then
sued Wilder and Paramount for breach of contract.
132
In ruling for Desny, the California Supreme Court confirmed
that story ideas may properly be the subject of contract, either
express or implied.'33 In the absence of an express agreement, the
Court provided a two-prong test to determine whether or not a valid
implied-in-fact contract was indeed created.'" First, the writer must
clearly condition his disclosure of the idea upon an obligation to pay
for it if used.'35 Second, the producer must know the condition before
the idea, and then voluntarily accept the disclosure of the idea, under
the writer's previous condition.'36 Thus, formation of an implied-in-
fact contract requires that disclosure of the idea be contingent upon a
promise to pay.'37 But, the Court emphasized that the producer must
125. See e.g. Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 440; Cal. Civ. Code § 1621 (West 1982);
see also Corbin on Contracts § 1.19 (1981).
126. 46 Cal. 2d 715 (1956).
127. Id. at 726.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 727.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 728.
133. Id. at 734.
134. Id. at 738-739.
135. ld. at 739.
136. Id. ("If the idea purveyor has clearly conditioned his offer to convey the idea
upon an obligation to pay for it if it is used by the offeree and the offeree, knowing the
condition before he knows the idea, voluntarily accepts its disclosure [necessarily on the
specified basis] and finds it valuable and uses it, the law will ... imply a promise to
compensate. Such inferred or implied promise, if it is to be found at all, must be based on
circumstances which were known to the producer at and preceding the time of disclosure
of the idea to him and he must voluntarily accept the disclosure, knowing the conditions
on which it is tendered.").
137. Id.
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promise to pay - simply using a submitted idea does not alone create
a contractual obligation to compensate.'3 Rather, the producer
manifests his intent to be bound by implicitly accepting the writer's
condition:
Unless the offeree has opportunity to reject he cannot be
said to accept. The idea man who blurts out his idea without
having first made his bargain has no one but himself to
blame for the loss of his bargaining power. The law will not
in any event, from demands stated subsequent to the
unconditioned disclosure of an abstract idea, imply a
promise to pay for an idea from the mere facts that the idea
has been conveyed, is valuable, and has been used for profit;
this is true even though the conveyance has been made with
the hope or expectation that some obligation will ensue."'
The Desny test has been used in countless idea submission cases
since its adoption,14 and remains in effect today.
B. Consideration
Besides mutual assent, a contract must also be supported by
consideration in order to be enforceable.' 4' This poses a potential
problem in the context of contracts in story ideas. Because ideas are
"free as the air," and are generally not considered "property," some
courts initially argued that the idea itself could not serve as valid
consideration. 42 Since plaintiffs were not furnishing property, the
defendants' promises to pay were deemed unenforceable . 4 Thus,
courts needed to find another source of consideration in the
transaction. This search eventually led to a significant difference
between New York and California law. In New York, courts held that
an idea must be "novel" to be protectable by contract; in California,
though, no such novelty was required.'44 Only recently has this gap
between the two states been narrowed.
In Chandler v. Roach, a California appellate court held that even
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See e.g. Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102 (1984); Mann v.
Columbia Pictures, Inc., 128 Cal. App. 3d 628 (1982); Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309
(1979); Blaustein v. Burton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 161 (1970); Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d
495 (1968); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 2d 593 (1966); Ware
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 253 Cal. App. 2d 489 (1967).
141. See generally Corbin on Contracts § 5.1.
142. See Nimmer on Copyright § 16.04[A].
143. Id.
144. Hudson Hotels Corp. v. Choice Hotels Intl., 995 F.2d 1173, 1178 (2d Cir. 1993)
("New York law dictates that an idea ... must demonstrate novelty.., to be protectible").
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though the idea could not be adequate consideration, the disclosure
of the idea could:
Even though an idea is not property subject to exclusive
ownership, its disclosure may be of substantial benefit to the
person to whom it is disclosed. That disclosure may
therefore be consideration for a promise to pay.
The rationale was that the disclosure must be valuable to the
producer, if it induces him to promise compensation in return. 4 6 Thus,
since this provided consideration, the Chandler court felt it was
unnecessary to require that the idea in question be novel."' The
parties could self-impose a novelty requirement in an express contract
if they wish, but California courts have refused to do so judicially in
the case of implied-in-fact contracts.
New York law, however, developed quite differently. As to
express contracts, at least, both states have always agreed that no
novelty is necessary unless the parties require it."' But in the case of
implied-in-fact contracts, New York courts have consistently held that
an idea must be novel to qualify for legal protection.49 Since New
York law grants property rights in ideas, the ideas themselves were
able to serve as consideration for such contracts."' But, the property
rights were dependent on the idea being novel and original - hence, a
lack of novelty was equivalent to a lack of consideration.'5 The
Second Circuit's decision in Murray v. National Broadcasting Co.
stressed that "the central issue is the uniqueness of the creation":52
145. Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 443 (citing Stanley, 35 Cal. 2d at 674 (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
146. Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 441.
147. See Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 443 ("We see no necessity to add the elements
of novelty and concreteness to implied-in-fact contracts with reference to authors. Their
status should be identically the same as that of any other person in any other implied-in-
fact contract situation... The courts should permit the parties to contract with each other
as they see fit and should not arbitrarily inject into the contract the requirements that the
idea be novel and concrete. If the parties have so agreed, that presents a different situation
and becomes a question of fact for the jury to decide.").
148. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 56; see also Stanley, 35 Cal. 2d. at 674-675 (Traynor, J.,
dissenting); Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d at 473.
149. See Hudson Hotels Corp., 995 F.2d at 1178; Downey, 31 N.Y.2d at 61 ("An idea
may be a property right. But, when one submits an idea to another, no promise to pay for
its use may be implied, and no asserted agreement enforced, if the elements of novelty and
originality are absent, since the property right in an idea is based upon these two
elements.").
150. Hudson Hotels Corp., 995 F.2d at 1178.
151. See id. at 1178; see also Downey, 31 N.Y.2d at 61.
152. 844 F.2d at 993-95.
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Ideas that reflect "genuine novelty and invention" are fully
protected against unauthorized use. But those ideas that are
not novel "are in the public domain and may freely be used
by anyone with impunity." Since such non-novel ideas are
not protectible as property, they cannot be stolen ....
special protection is afforded only to truly innovative ideas
while allowing free use of ideas that are "merely clever or
useful adaptations of existing knowledge."'53
Murray had submitted an idea to NBC for a wholesome family
sitcom, with a twist."4 His Father's Day was similar to programs like
Father Knows Best and The Dick Van Dyke Show, except all of the
actors would be African-American. 5 ' Four years later, Bill Cosby
scored a smash hit with The Cosby Show, a wholesome family sitcom
with an entirely African-American cast.'56 Murray sued NBC for
stealing his idea, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of
NBC because the concept was unoriginal: "the mere idea for a
situation comedy about a nonstereotypical black family... is not
novel and thus may be used with impunity."'57 It was clear that New
York and California law had grown far apart.
However, the recent Second Circuit case of Nadel v. Play-by-
Play Toys & Novelties, Inc.'5"' brought them much closer together.
Nadel was a toy inventor, who had developed a prototype for a plush
toy monkey, which sat upright, emitted sound, and spun when placed
on a flat surface.'59 He showed the prototype to an executive from
Play-by-Play, and there was allegedly an implied agreement that
Nadel would be compensated if his idea was used.'6" At a toy fair the
following year, Play-by-Play introduced "Tornado Taz," a plush toy
that sits upright, emits sound, and spins on flat surfaces. Nadel sued,
but the court granted summary judgment for Play-by-Play because
the idea was not novel.
6'
The Second Circuit, however, vacated the dismissal of the
contract claim, holding that the novelty requirement varies depending
153. Id. at 993 (citing Educational Sales Programs v. Dreyfus Corp., 317 N.Y.S.2d 840,
844 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.C. 1970), and Ed Graham Prod., Inc. v. National Broad. Co., 347
N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (1973)).
154. Id. at 990.
155. Id. at 989.
156. Id. at 990.
157. Id. at 995.
158. 208 F.3d 368 (2nd Cir. 2000).
159. Id. at 372 (demonstrating that the same law governs product idea submissions as
story idea submissions).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 373.
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on the theory asserted.' 62 For a misappropriation of property claim,
generally, the idea must be novel and original.' 63 This is because
"unoriginal, known ideas have no value as property and the law does
not protect against the use of that which is free an available to all."'
6
For an implied-in-fact contract claim, however, the idea need only be
novel to the recipient of the idea.16 As long as the idea is not already
known to the recipient, then it is valuable enough to serve as
sufficient consideration to support the contract - it is not necessary
for the idea to be novel or original.'6 6 This abrogated Murray, and
considerably narrowed the gap between New York and California
law. But, Nadel did not eliminate the gap completely. First, plaintiffs
still must demonstrate novelty to the recipient as an element of their
claim.'67 It may be a lesser requirement, but it is a requirement
nonetheless. Second, the court maintained that some ideas may be so
unoriginal and non-novel that they are imputed to be "known to
every person," including the recipient, and thus would not satisfy
even Nadel's reduced novelty requirement. 68 Therefore, although
Nadel represents a significant change in New York law, the potential




The final element of an idea submission claim is breach.7° Even if
a writer can prove a contract was formed, and is supported by
consideration, he must still show the contract was ultimately
162. Id.
163. Id. at 375.
164. Id. at 380.
165. Id. at 374 (interpreting Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d 470, to reach these conclusions).
166. Id. at 376.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 378-79 (citing Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 195 N.Y.S. 574, 575-76 (1922); Ed
Graham Prod., 347 N.Y.S.2d at 769 ("Where plaintiff's idea is wholly lacking in novelty,
no cause of action in contract or tort can stand."); and Educational Sales Programs, 317
N.Y.S.2d at 843-44 ("Nothing is bestowed if the facts of a 'secret' imparted in confidence
are already the subject of general knowledge."))
169. If this exception is interpreted broadly, the result could very well be a de facto
return to Murray. Instead of requiring general novelty as an element of the claim, courts
could just hold that the idea is so unoriginal that it is essentially known to everyone. By
imputing knowledge of the idea to the recipient, the court would essentially be saying that
the idea is non-novel generally - defeating the claim in the exactly the same way that
Murray would have.
170. See generally Corbin on Contracts § 943.
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broken."' Essentially, the plaintiff must prove that his idea was
actually used, which would trigger the defendant's promise of
compensation. 11If the producer refuses to pay, then the contract has
been breached. Thus, the pivotal issue is what constitutes "use" of the
writer's idea.13 This has potential to be relatively simple for an
express contract, since the parties are free to define "use" as they
wish. 74 But, as previously discussed, express contracts in story ideas
are quite uncommon.' Other forms of direct evidence proving use of
176the idea are also rare.
As a result, writers typically must rely on more circumstantial
proof to show that their idea was used.17 ' According to Professor
Lionel Sobel, "the law permits actual use of a plaintiff's idea to be
inferred from evidence of access and similarity. 17'8 Thus, just as in
copyright infringement cases, access and similarity to the writer's idea
are crucial to the outcome of an idea submission claim. Also, under
the so-called "Inverse Ratio Rule," greater evidence of similarity may
allow for lesser evidence of access, and vice versa - so long as both
elements are present, and together are strong enough to support an
inference that the plaintiff's idea was used 7 9 This test makes a good
deal of sense. If the defendant can show that he had no access to the
idea, then a court must necessarily conclude that he did not copy it.8
Likewise, if there are few similarities between the writer's idea and
the producer's final product, it is doubtful that one could legitimately
consider the producer to have "used" the idea.
However, even if the writer demonstrates access and similarity,
the producer may still argue the defense of independent creation."'
171. See id.
172. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 65.
173. See generally Nimmer on Copyright § 16.05; Sobel, supra n. 95, at 65.
174. See Nimmer on Copyright § 16.05.
175. Supra Part III(A).
176. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 67. (Professor Sobel gives an example of "direct
evidence of use" in Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd without op., 598
F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).) (In that case, the defendant had acknowledged the plaintiff's
article as an "inspiration" for his novel.).
177. See Sobel, supra n. 95 at 67.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 70 (citing Golding, 35 Cal. 2d at 695).
180. See e.g. Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 128 Cal. App. 3d 628 (1982).
181. See id.; Nadel, 208 F.3d at 380 n. 10 ("In order to recover for breach of contract,
a plaintiff must demonstrate some nexus or causal connection between his or her
disclosure and the defendant's use of the idea, i.e., where there is an independent source
for the idea used by the defendant, there may be no breach of contract."); Klekas, 150 Cal.
App. 3d at 1115 (holding plaintiff's manuscript "had nothing to do with the writing of the
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This means that the plaintiff is only entitled to compensation if the
defendant actually used his submission; a producer will not be
punished if he comes up with the idea on his own. Courts have held
that "if the idea used by the defendant was independently developed
or acquired from someone else, the defendant is not obligated to pay
the plaintiff for it" - even if the independently created or acquired
idea is exactly the same as the one the writer submitted."8 2 Of course,
if the defendant cannot rebut the inference of actual use by proof of
independent creation, then the result is a breach of contract and a
legal duty to compensate. 3
D. Federal Preemption of Idea Submission Claims
Having analyzed each of the elements of an idea submission
claim, it is important to understand the relationship between
copyright law and the law of ideas. Because copyright law is
exclusively federal, and the legal protection of ideas rests on state
law, there is a potential for federal preemption of idea submission
claims under the Supremacy Clause.184 This issue is absolutely crucial.
If a contractual claim is preempted, then the plaintiff's only option is
to sue under the more demanding theory of copyright infringement.
screenplay or the production of the film"); see also Sobel, supra n. 95, at 75.
182. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 65.
183. But see id. at 69, 77-87. Professor Sobel argues that there is a second step to the
analysis of breach. In addition to proving that the defendant actually used plaintiff's idea,
he contends that the defendant's use must be "substantially similar" to the idea submitted.
Id. According to Professor Sobel, the similarity requirement referred to in the text only
serves to prove use of plaintiff's idea as opposed to independent creation. Id. The second
requirement, "substantial similarity," is then used to determine whether the use is similar
enough to trigger an obligation to pay. Id.
The text does not analyze this supposed second requirement, because it is the author's
opinion that it is not really a requirement at all. Contracts for story ideas basically make
the following bargain: the writer promises to furnish his idea, and the producer promises
to pay the writer if the idea is used. Thus, the first step in the analysis - determining actual
use - is the only step needed. If the court can infer that the defendant did in fact use
plaintiff's idea, then the condition of the contract is satisfied and the defendant is required
to perform. Any references to "substantial similarity" in the case law is likely a court's
attempt to determine actual use, and not a second analytical step.
This view is in accord with that of the Nimmer treatise. See Nimmer on Copyright, § 16.08
n. 58 ("If there is a contractual or other obligation to pay for an idea, the defendant cannot
avoid such liability by reason of the fact that he did not copy more than the abstract or
basic idea of plaintiff's work.")(citing Donahue, 245 Cal. App. 2d at 593, and Stone v.
Goodson, 8 N.Y.2d 8, 167 N.E. 2d 328, 200 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1960)).
Perhaps Professor Sobel's argument is correct in the copyright context - a court must first
use similarity to infer copying, and then to determine infringement. But, in story idea
contract cases, use and breach occur simultaneously. As soon as an idea is used, and a
producer refuses to compensate, the contract is breached.
184. U.S. Const., art. VI.
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Since abstract ideas are not protected by copyright law,' 5 the plaintiff
would have to demonstrate both that his submission was eligible for
copyright protection and that the defendant's product is
"substantially similar" to plaintiff's submitted work.1 6 Both of these
elements present difficult, perhaps insurmountable, obstacles for the
writer who submits a mere treatment or story outline, and faces a
producer with a fully developed product. Clearly, then, federal
preemption is an issue of critical importance to the law of idea
submission claims.
Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 is the provision
governing preemption. 87 It provides a two-prong test to determine if a
state law claim is preempted. '88 First, the court must decide whether
"the subject matter of the claim comes within the subject matter of
the Copyright Act."'89 There is some dispute as to what this "subject
matter" is, though all courts agree that the idea must at least be "fixed
in a tangible medium of expression ' ' to satisfy this first prong. T9
Second, the court must ascertain "whether the rights protected by the
state law claim are the equivalent of any of the exclusive rights
protected by the federal Copyright Act."'92 This is determined by
examining the elements of the state law claim and comparing them to
the elements of copyright infringement; if the state law claim contains
an "extra element," then the rights it protects are not "equivalent" to
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996).
186. See Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01.
187. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1996) ("On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103.").
188. Id. § 301.
189. See id. § 301; see also Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d
973, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1987); Endemol Entertainment B. V. v. Twentieth Television, Inc., 48
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1524,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 29, 1998), Worth v.
Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 (C.D.Cal. 1997); see generally Samuel M.
Bayard, Note, Chihuahuas, Seventh Circuit Judges, and Movie Scripts, Oh My!: Copyright
Preemption of Contracts to Protect Ideas, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 603, 609 (2001).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
191. This serves to distinguish oral idea pitches from written treatments and story
outlines. Thus, if a writer discloses his idea to a producer orally without ever committing it
to writing or any other "fixed medium of expression," his idea is clearly not within the
"subject matter" of copyright as defined in §102. The first prong would fail, and there
would be no federal preemption. However, purely oral disclosures are rare, and so this
distinction lacks practical force given the prevalence of treatments and outlines. See
Bayard, supra n. 189, at 610.
192. See 17 U.S.C. § 301; Bayard, supra n. 189, at 610.
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those protected by copyright, and there is no preemption.93 If both
prongs are answered affirmatively, then the claim is preempted under
section 301.
Currently, it is uncertain how this test applies to state law
implied-in-fact contract claims. As to the first prong of the test, most
courts in recent years have held that ideas can be "within the subject
matter of the Copyright Act" for preemption purposes, as long as
they are fixed in a written work.'' 4 Critics of this position95 argue that
ideas cannot possibly be within the subject matter of the Copyright
Act "as specified by sections 102 and 103, ' 196 because section 102 -
which is titled "Subject Matter of Copyright"'" - explicitly excludes
ideas from its scope. 98 However, courts have refuted this argument
based on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Berge v. Trustees of the
University of Alabama,'" where it was held that the "[s]cope and
protection are not synonyms .... [T]he shadow actually cast by the
Act's preemption is notably broader than the wing of its
protection. ' 2 Thus, although ideas are not within the subject matter
of copyright for purposes of protection, they do fall within the subject
matter of copyright for purposes of preemption." '
As to the application of the second prong, there is much more
disagreement. On one hand, the nature of a contract claim is very
different from that of a copyright claim."2 Thus, it is hard to consider
193. See e.g. Worth, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 821; Computer Assoc. Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992); see generally Bayard, supra n. 189, at 612-13 (citing Paul
Goldstein, Copyright, Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines: Cases and Materials
on the Law of Intellectual Property § 15.2.2 (4th ed. 1997) ("Courts generally hold that a
state right is not equivalent to copyright, and thus is not subject to preemption, if the state
cause of action contains an operative element that is absent from the cause of action for
copyright infringement.")).
194. See Berge v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 916 (1997); Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7762 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (citing Berge, 104 F.3d 1453); Katz Dochrermann & Epstein,
Inc. v. Home Box Office, 1999 WL 179603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999); Endemol
Entertainment, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 at *9 ("Even though the ideas embodied in a
work covered by the Copyright Act fall outside copyright protection, this does not mean
that they fall outside the Act's scope regarding its subject matter.").
195. See generally Glen L. Kulik, Copyright Preemption: Is This the End of Desny v.
Wilder? 21 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2000).
196. See 17 U.S.C. § 301.
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
198. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
199. 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 916 (1997).
200. Id. at 1463.
201. See supra n. 194.
202. See e.g. Miller v. Miramax Film Corp., No. CV 99-08526 at 9 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 24,
1999); Rokos v. Peck, 182 Cal. App. 3d 604 (1986); see also Kulik, supra n. 195, at 11 n. 84,
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them "equivalent" under section 301."3 In the Seventh Circuit
decision of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg" Judge Easterbrook wrote
that rights:
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright" are rights established by law - rights
that restrict the options of persons who are strangers to the
author. Copyright law forbids duplication, public
performance, and so on, unless the person wishing to copy
or perform the work gets permission; silence means a ban on
copying. A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts,
by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may
do as they please, so contracts do not create "exclusive
rights."2'.
Since a contract for ideas is only enforceable between the parties,
it does not give anyone a "monopoly" over the idea like copyright
does - it does not "withdraw the idea from general circulation."""
Anyone who is not a party to the contract (i.e., anyone other than the
writer and producer) is free to use the idea as they wish. Furthermore,
some courts point out that contracts contain the "extra element" of a
promise. °7 Since the plaintiff must prove that a contractual
relationship existed, they argue, an idea submission claim is far from
"equivalent" to a copyright infringement action.
However, other courts have held that these rights may be
"equivalent" in some cases, and as a result have preempted implied-
in-fact contract claims."' One recent example is Selby v. New Line
Cinema."9 Plaintiff William Selby had written a screenplay involving
20 ("In fact, if one understands the law correctly, it is the relationship that is being
enforced rather than the idea which is being protected... The plaintiffs in Desny and
Rokos sued on a state law theory because the idea, rather than the expression of the idea,
was allegedly misused.").
203. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
204. 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). For an in-depth review of the ProCD case, see
Bayard, supra n. 189, at 614-18.
205. Id. at 1454.
206. See Rokos, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 614; 227 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
207. See e.g. Berkla v. Corel Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 1999); Katz v.
Home Box Office, 1999 LEXIS 3971 (S.D.N.Y. March 21,1999); Canter v. West Publ'g
Co., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Hogan v. D.C. Comics, 1997 WL 570871
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1997); see also Nimmer on Copyright, § 16.04 and Kulik, supra n. 195, at
21 (citing Brown v. MoJo Records, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9155, at *12 (D. Or. June 29,
2000)).
208. See Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000);
Metrano, supra n. 124; Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 840 (W.D.Mich.
1999), Endemol Entertainment, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 1998);
Worth, 5 F. Supp. 2d 816; see generally Bayard, supra n. 189, at 619-26.
209. 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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time-travel called "Doubletime," and submitted it to New Line.10
Later, New Line purchased the screenplay of a different writer,
entitled "Frequency," that involved a similar plot.21' Selby then sued
for breach of implied-in-fact contract, claiming that New Line knew
he expected to be compensated if his idea was used. 2 But the court
ruled that his state law claim was preempted by section 301.213 First,
the court rejected the notion that a contractual promise is always an
"extra element":
Suppose, e.g.,.that the defendant promised "I will not
infringe any copyright.., in the script that you are
proposing to show me." In that case, the promise is so
inextricably entwined with the copyright that to permit the
promisee to sue upon it would undermine the preemption
feature of the Copyright Act.214
Next, the court pointed out that even Judge Easterbrook in his
ProCD opinion refused to adopt "a rule that anything with the label
'contract' is necessarily outside the preemption clause., 215 The court
held that contract rights are "equivalent" to copyright rights
whenever "the alleged promise not to 'use' plaintiff's ideas does not
prohibit any conduct beyond that prohibited by the Copyright Act."2 '6
Since Selby's contract could be breached "by the mere act of
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, 217 - precisely the
sort of conduct that would constitute copyright infringement - the test
of equivalence was met, and the contract claim was preempted.218
Basically, Selby held that a contract claim is preempted if it asserts
"no additional rights other than promising not to benefit from the
plaintiff's work.,
21 1
This split of authority over the application of section 301 to
implied-in-fact contracts has created a great deal of ambiguity
concerning the continued viability of idea submission claims. Both
210. Id. at 1055.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1054.
214. Id. at 1060 (citing Endemol Entertainment, 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1528).
215. Id. (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455).
216. Id. at 1061-62.
217. See Natl. Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Intl., Inc., 991 F. 2d 426, 431
(8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861 (citing Nimmer on Copyright, § 1.01(B)(1)(a)).
218. Selby, 96 F. Supp. at 1062.
219. Id. (quoting Endemol Ent., 1998 WL 785300 at 1528); see also Wrench, 51 F.
Supp. 2d at 853 ("[A] promise not to use another's ideas and concepts without paying for
them 'is equivalent to the protection provided by section 106 of the Copyright Act."');
Bayard, supra n. 189, at 619.
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approaches have cases to support them."' Although the Selby line of
precedent seems to presently have more momentum, the ultimate
decision on preemption will have to come from the federal Courts of
Appeals. 2' As of now, no clear answer has emerged.
IV
Proposed Changes
Today idea submission claims continue to be a prominent source
of Hollywood litigation, and many of the legal issues involved remain
unsettled. In part, this is due to the fact that most cases settle,
resulting in relatively few judicial opinions. But even in cases that do
produce opinions, the law is far from fixed. Debates continue as to
what a plaintiff must show to establish formation of an implied-in-fact
contract, what is required to prove "use" of an idea, and over the all-
important application of the copyright preemption doctrine. For all of
these topics, it is necessary to consider not just the rules, but the
broader social policies behind the rules. Only when the doctrine is
examined in light of its policy purposes can one accurately assess its
successes and failures, and best determine how the law should be
shaped for the future. After exploring what the law is, the next step is
to ask what the law should be.
A. The Need for Protection of Ideas
At the outset, it is imperative to understand why the law protects
ideas at all. After all, no one has ever seriously disagreed with Justice
Brandeis's famous opinion that ideas are "free as the air to common
use." '222 As demonstrated by the scope of the Copyright Act, Congress
refuses (and rightfully so) to grant "exclusive rights" in ideas. 3 Yet,
for some reason, these complex legal doctrines have emerged.
Perhaps the best rationale for idea protection is rooted in the
220. Supra Part III.
221. The Ninth Circuit, which is arguably the most important for idea submission
claims since it includes California, confirmed that this remains an open issue. It hinted (in
an unpublished decision) that: "rights created by contract do not create exclusive rights
and thus a claim for inducing breach of contract is normally not equivalent to the rights
within the scope of the Copyright Act." But the court went on to say: "However, this
circuit has not definitively ruled on this issue in the context presented by this appeal." See
Kulik, supra n. 195, at 3 n. 15 (quoting Star Patrol Ent., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29994, at *9 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997)).
222. See Intl. News Serv., 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In fact, this
proposition is considered "well rooted in our jurisprudence." See Nimmer on Copyright §
16.01.
223. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
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nature of the industry itself. Because Hollywood can only produce a
limited number of films and television shows, ultimately most story
concepts are rejected. Therefore it would be impractical for a writer
to complete a full, copyrightable script before he submits the story to
a studio for consideration.114 It would be a tremendous waste of time,
since the majority of his ideas will go unused. But, if copyright were
the only legal tool available to protect his work, the writer would be
forced into one of two equally unattractive options. He could take the
time to finish his script so that it would qualify for copyright, in order
to ensure its protection, but this low productivity combined with the
slim probability of success makes this too financially unstable. In
order to make a living, writers need to be as prolific as possible. In the
alternative, he could just compose treatments or story outlines, and
refrain from writing a full script until a producer showed interest in a
particular idea. However, since such outlines are rarely copyrightable,
the writer would be running the risk of having his ideas stolen without
any legal remedy. Producers would steal with impunity, which would
discourage people from becoming writers in the first place. In the
1950s, this was precisely the argument made to the courts. 5
Besides the nature of the industry, protection of ideas may have
also been motivated by a broader concern for fairness. There is just
something that seems inherently wrong in allowing producers to
accept an idea from a writer and use it for their own personal gain,
without ever giving the writer anything in return. From this
perspective, the policy for idea protection is similar to that of unjust
enrichment in contract law; the writer rendered a service by which the
producer profited, and he should therefore be compensated. 6
Moreover, it is helpful to recall the purpose of intellectual property
law in general - "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts., 227 Just as with copyright, the law must protect a writer's ideas in
order to preserve incentive for future writers to create.
224. See Rokos, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 613 (citing John A. Tretheway, Note, Literary
Property: Idea Protection by Contract Requirement of Novelty, 26 S. Cal. L. Rev. 459
(1953) ("In many courts it is now being argued by literary artists that they must have some
form of protection for their ideas. They argue that in motion picture story writing and
television program writing, it has become necessary to submit ideas to the show producers,
and not develop them into complete works until and unless they are approved.")).
225. Id.
226. See generally Corbin on Contracts § 1.20.
227. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
228. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991). As discussed above, this need for incentives is especially important in the context
of entertainment ideas, where most often the writer's only option is to submit an
uncopyrightable treatment or outline.
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B. Potential Legal Theories for Idea Protection
All of these policies demonstrate the need for the legal
protection of ideas. Of course, the next problem was to choose a legal
theory that would provide an appropriate level of protection. When
California Civil Code section 980 was amended in 1947 to eliminate
exclusive rights in "products of the mind,"22 9 the theory based on
property law was wisely rejected. Because of their abstract character,
ideas are simply not conducive to being classified as property. One
cannot have a monopoly over something that exists only in the mind;
if anyone else can think up the same idea on their own, it can hardly
be the subject of "ownership" to the exclusion of all others.23
With its misappropriation claim, though, New York does
recognize some form of property interests in certain ideas.' It is
often criticized for this.232 However, what the critics ignore is that New
York recognizes only a limited property interest. For such an interest
to apply, the plaintiff must prove both key elements - that the idea is
novel and concrete, and that the requisite legal relationship existed
between the parties.233 By including these elements, New York law
avoids the pitfalls encountered by California's old section 980. Since
there must be a legal relationship between the parties, it is clear that
the misappropriation theory does not confer wholly "exclusive rights"
to the idea's creator. Much like a contract, the plaintiff's right to
exclude is only enforceable against the defendant (or anyone else in
the requisite legal relationship). Furthermore, the limits of this
property interest are also preserved by the novelty requirement. If a
defendant can demonstrate independent creation or a lack of access
to the plaintiff's idea, then it is likely the idea would not be
considered novel. The fact that two people came up with the same
basic story independent of one another would tend to suggest that it is
not a genuinely unique idea. Without novelty, there would be no
protectable property interest, thereby eliminating any concerns about
monopoly over "products of the mind." Basically, New York's
misappropriation claim is not subject to the usual criticisms about
229. See Cal. Civ. Code § 980 (Historical Note).
230. See e.g. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454; Kulik, supra n. 195, at 15; Sobel, supra n. 95, at
27.
231. See Camilla M. Jackson, Note, "I've Got This Great Idea for a Movie!": A
Comparison of the Laws in California and New York that Protect Idea Submissions, 21
Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 47, 60 (1996).
232. Id. at 63 (citing Sobel, supra n. 95, at 27).
233. See McGhan, 608 F. Supp. at 284; see also Hogan v. D.C. Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d
298, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1216-
17 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); supra nn. 112-115.
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treating ideas as property because, as a generalrule, it actually does
not treat them like property. Rather, it only reserves this status for a
particular class of ideas - setting up a doctrine that takes the age-old
principles of property law and adapts them to fit the specialized
context of idea protection.
As Professor Nimmer pointed out, it is necessary to employ these
"new applications of traditional legal theories 234 because ideas do not
fit comfortably under any other area of the law. Safeguarding ideas is
clearly an important goal, but finding suitable means to reach that
goal is difficult. There is no applicable statute. Classical property law
would provide too much protection, and copyright provides no
protection at all.235 Therefore, the best approach is to combine their
relative strengths - the law should enable a writer to secure
compensation for the use of his idea, but without granting him
exclusive rights in it. In New York's misappropriation claim, this was
accomplished by allowing a property interest in ideas, and then
restricting it through the novelty and legal relationship requirements.
Primarily, though, the best way to achieve this balance is through
contract law. Contracts for story ideas create a legal duty to
compensate the writer, but that duty is only enforceable against the
parties to the agreement. This leaves the idea itself in the public
domain, available for free to everyone except the studio or producer
who accepted the submission. Thus courts avoid all of the problems
associated with the concept of ideas as property; liability is based
simply on a promise, rather than on implausible notions of ownership.
Of course, relying on contract law is not without its disadvantages.
Difficult questions remain over how to apply the familiar legal rules
of contract to best fulfill the policy goals underlying idea submission
claims.
C. The Desny Test for Formation
The first major issue is determining when a court should decide
that an implied-in-fact contract was formed. Recall that the test set
forth in Desny had two prongs: the writer must clearly condition his
disclosure of the idea on the producer's promise to pay, and the
producer must voluntarily accept the disclosure understanding the
condition.236 This standard, if strictly construed, would be unduly
harsh on writers. Since the vast majority of writers are struggling to
234. See Nimmer on Copyright § 16.01.
235. Id.
236. 46 Cal. 2d at 739; see supra Part II[(A).
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get their big break, they completely lack the power to bargain. If
writers must clearly condition disclosure on a promise to pay, no
rational producer would accept - as Justice Carter put it in his Desny
concurrence, "[i]f he says to whomever he is permitted to see... 'I
won't tell you what my idea is until you promise to pay me for it,' it
takes no Sherlock Holmes to figure out what the answer will be!,
237
Consequently, the Desny test may be inadequate to provide the
necessary protection of ideas.
As an alternative, Justice Carter argued that it should be
presumed that producers know the writer expects compensation in
exchange for his idea:
It is at that time, without anything being said, known to both
parties that the one is there to sell, and the other to buy.
This is surely true of a department store when merchandise
is displayed on the counter, it is understood by anyone
entering the store that the merchandise so displayed is for
sale, [and] it is completely unnecessary for the storekeeper,
or anyone in his employ, to state to anyone entering the
store that all articles there are for sale. I am at a loss to see
why any different rules should apply when it is ideas for sale
rather than the normal run of merchandise.23"
Several plaintiffs have asserted this very same argument,
claiming that there is an "industry custom" to pay for idea
submissions if they are used.2 39 Thus, producers do not need to be told
that idea disclosures are conditional upon a promise to pay - they
already know. For example, in Whitfield v. Lear,24 the plaintiff
pointed out that when a producer is not interested in reading a script,
it is typically returned to the writer unopened. 24' "If, however, a studio
or producer is notified that a script is forthcoming and opens and
reviews it when it arrives, that studio or producer has by custom
implicitly promised to pay for the ideas if used. 2 42 The court was
sufficiently persuaded by this to deny the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and held that the producer's assent was an issue
237. Id. at 755 (Carter, J., concurring in result only).
238. Id. at 756.
239. See generally Sobel, supra n. 95, at 44-47; Nimmer on Copyright § 16.05(B).
Professor Sobel questions whether or not such an industry custom does actually exist, and
argues that the majority in Desny clearly held that the burden is on the writer to make his
expectation of payment known to the producer. Sobel, supra n. 95, at 44-47. Thus, he
believes that Desny does not allow industry custom, even if it does exist, to create a
presumption that would reduce the plaintiff's burden. Id.
240. 751 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984).
241. Id. at 93.
242. Id.
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of fact for trial.243 If other courts were to accept this "industry custom"
position as indeed some have,244 then this lenient application of Desny
would reduce the heavy burden imposed by the test as it is written.
Without a doubt, this would enhance the level of legal protection
afforded to writers.
However, one must also consider the interests of producers.
Because they are always the ones accused of stealing (and often
justifiably so), it is easy to focus solely on making the law strong
enough to ensure the proper protection of writers. This would be a
big mistake, though. The effects of legal rules are felt by both the
writer and producer equally, and will shape their subsequent
behavior. Producers will adjust their behavior in response to the law,
in order to shield themselves from future liability. Therefore, any
legal doctrine that is too demanding on producers may end up
altering the idea submission relationship, with severely negative
consequences for the writers. The "industry custom" argument is a
perfect example of this. If a producer were presumed to know that
the disclosure is conditioned upon a promise to pay, as Justice Carter
suggested,245 then a contract would be formed every time an idea is
received. This would expose producers and studios to a far-reaching
scope of potential liability. They would inevitably face a flood of
lawsuits (some frivolous, some with merit) by plaintiffs claiming to be
owed compensation under an implied agreement. Perhaps quite
literally, they would be sued for every single film or television
program produced. Valuable time and resources would be lost to
litigation. Independent creation would be their only defense.
Ultimately, producers would have no choice but to limit the number
of ideas they accept.4 6
243. Id. ("We conclude that the communications in question and the allegation of
custom in the industry are sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment on this
point."); see also Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal.App.2d at 504 ("Tors admitted that pilots are
made iti the industry for the purpose of showing them to prospective purchases with a
view to selling them commercially to make a series.").
244. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 46 n. 149 (citing Kurlan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 40
Cal. 2d 799, 811 (1953); Bevan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601,608 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., 529 F. Supp. 1204; McGhan, 608 F. Supp. 277;
but see Grombach Prod. v. Waring, 293 N.Y. 609, 59 N.E.2d 425 (1944) ("Such a custom
cannot ' ... create a contract where there has been no agreement by the parties and none
is implied by law .... no 'deal' was made between the plaintiff and defendant." (quoting
Stulsaft v. Mercer Tube & Mfg. Co., 288 N.Y. 255,260 (1942)).
245. 46 Cal. 2d at 755 (Carter, J., concurring in result only).
246. See Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 592 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 (D.R.I. 1984), rev'd,
763 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1985) ("If [idea recipients] could not effectively safeguard
themselves... they might well have to curtail submissions.").
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In fact, this has already occurred, through the use of releases. In
large part because of cases like Whitfield, studios refuse to accept any
unsolicited ideas unless the writer agrees to release all of his rights to
the material.2 47 This puts the many writers who are unable to get an
agent in the worst position of all - they have the choice of either
waiving their rights to compensation or not having their idea
considered at all. Because of this, some critics have suggested that
idea submission releases are unenforceable contracts of adhesion.248
They argue that the huge disparity in bargaining power renders them
unconscionable. But this view also overlooks the enormous
disadvantages to writers that would follow if a court held releases
invalid. If releases were ruled unenforceable, producers would only
accept idea submissions from writers with agents; unrepresented
writers would be cut off from access to the studios completely.249 As
Professor Sobel correctly points out, this would be "a consequence
more harmful to aspiring writers than the possibility that releases will
bar some of them from suing for the suspected theft of their ideas. 25 °
By signing a release, a writer will at least get his idea considered, and
he might even get noticed."' Thus, despite their apparent unfairness,
courts should continue to enforce idea submission releases.252
For writers who do have agents, however, the issue as to the
proper standard for contract formation remains unclear. The Desny
rule seems to be hard on writers, but the "industry custom" position
may threaten the market for ideas. Nevertheless, in light of the policy
considerations involved, Justice Carter's position should prevail - the
Desny test should be modified so that courts will imply a promise to
pay by producers whenever they accept a submitted idea not covered
247. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 90; see also supra Part 1I.
248. For a discussion of the various theories critics have used to attack idea
submission releases, see Nimmer on Copyright, § 16.05 n. 30 (including Cal. Civ. Code §
1668, which provides that "[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly,
to exempt any one from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy
of the law."); but see Land v. Jerry Lewis Prod., Inc., 140 U.S.P.Q. 351 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1964) ("1 do not doubt that producers by appropriate contracts could provide for
submission of literary properties free from any liability on their part to pay for general
ideas embalmed in the literary properties under submission.").
249. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 91.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 90-91.
252. With releases in place, many people might decide to keep their ideas to
themselves instead of submitting them subject to a waiver. In this way, allowing releases
hurt the flow of creativity. However, whatever limit this imposes would pale in comparison
to the limit on creativity that would result if releases were unenforceable.
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by a release.
This shift will not radically alter the balance of power in
Hollywood, but it will have some important consequences.
Unfortunately, the change would likely do nothing to help
unrepresented writers. Since releases would remain enforceable,
producers would retain their immunity against lawsuits based on
unsolicited ideas. However, this new legal rule would have a
significant effect on all the idea submission claims that do go to court.
It would effectively shift the burden of proof on the formation issue.
Instead of having to show that he clearly conditioned disclosure on a
promise to pay, the plaintiff would merely have to prove that he
offered the idea and the producer accepted it, and a contract would
be formed. In the end, this new rule would bring about two distinct
categories of results - unsolicited ideas would be unprotected because
of releases, but any idea presented through an agent would always be
protected under an implied-in-fact contract.
This change is beneficial for three reasons. First, the new rule
would make the law more even-handed by placing writers and
producers on a more equal footing relative to their positions under
Desny. Under current law, writers face an entirely uphill battle to
obtain compensation for their ideas. Producers, on the other hand,
have all the advantages. Releases enable them to receive many ideas
for free. Plus, even if a writer does not sign a release, producers can
use their superior bargaining power to refuse any disclosure that is
clearly conditioned upon a promise to pay. This new rule, on the
other hand, would level the playing field. Since a contract would be
formed whenever a producer accepted an idea without a release,
writers would receive the benefit of the burden of proof. However,
the producers would still have the protection of releases, which would
prevent them from being overwhelmed by frivolous litigation. They
would also have several defenses, such as independent creation,
federal preemption, or perhaps novelty; just because a contract is
formed does not automatically mean the producer must pay. There
will be costs associated with the inevitable increase in litigation, but
the social interest in increasing idea protection outweighs them.
Second, the new rule would better comply with the traditional
principles of implied-in-fact contract doctrine. Under these principles,
the key to the formation of a story idea contract is whether or not the
producer knows that the writer expects compensation for his idea. If
the producer knows this, and accepts the idea anyway, then his
acceptance constitutes an implicit agreement to pay. This knowledge
is crucial because, as Desny emphasized, "unless the offeree has
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opportunity to reject he cannot be said to accept." '253 If a writer "blurts
out his idea without having first made his bargain," '254 there is no
mutual assent and no contract. Thus, the new rule will reach the
correct results. The acceptance of unsolicited ideas - the equivalent of
"blurting out an idea without having first made a bargain" - should
not (and will not, because of releases) lead to contract formation.
However, when an idea is received through an agent, the producer is
clearly put on notice that the writer expects compensation for his
idea. Agents are hired for one reason, to sell the writer's ideas. All
producers know this, and so any acceptance of an idea through an
agent should be sufficient to constitute an implicit agreement to pay.
There is no need for the plaintiff to "clearly condition" his disclosure,
as Desny requires; the new rule would recognize that the mere
presence of an agent is sufficient to alert the producer to the fact that
the writer expects compensation.
Third, and arguably most important, this shift in the law would
be fully insulated against a reaction by the producers. Under Desny, it
is fairly simple for a studio or network to avoid forming contracts by
using releases and by turning away anyone who conditions disclosure
on a promise to pay. The new rule, though, would not be so easily
avoided. Producers would be unable to adopt self-defense measures.
First, they could not attempt to use releases with agents, as they could
if they were dealing with an individual writer. No agent would ever be
foolish enough to waive his client's right to compensation. Next,
studios could try to utilize express contracts more often. If the law
will imply a contract whenever a solicited idea is accepted anyway,
they might feel it is easier to just put it all in writing, in order to
clearly define the terms and conditions of the agreement. This may
allow studios to manipulate the definition of "use" of an idea, but the
contract would most definitely contain a promise to pay if use occurs.
Finally, producers would not be able to simply refuse to deal with
agents.' Collectively agents have the bargaining power that
individual writers lack; they are producers' main source of idea
submissions. While unsolicited idea submissions are a nuisance,
253. 46 Cal. 2d at 739.
254. Id.
255. It is possible that producers could refuse to deal with many lesser-known agents,
and only accept submissions through established contacts. This would be a problem for
unproven writers, who can only get representation through these lower-tier agents. This is
unlikely, however, because it is doubtful that producers would want to restrict their pool
of potential ideas from up-and-coming writers. Many of these writers could be young
prospects that the industry will need in the future; they do not present the same type of
nuisance to studios as unsolicited idea submissions.
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producers depend on agents to find them new projects. After all, they
have to get their ideas from somewhere. Thus the new rule would
prevent producers from shielding themselves from the effects of the
law.
In sum, the Desny test for contract formation should be
modified. The law should imply an agreement whenever a producer
accepts an idea that is not subject to a release. Shifting the burden of
proof will do a great deal to protect many writers. Some will criticize
this position for not affording protection to unrepresented writers,
but failing to enforce releases would make them even worse off. This
proposed change maintains the delicate balance between the interests
of writers and producers, which is necessary to foster the creativity
that fuels Hollywood.
D. Novelty
Another important issue is whether or not courts should require
an idea to be novel in order for it to qualify for protection under state
law. As discussed earlier, New York and California have historically
split on this question. In California all ideas are protectable by
contract, regardless of their novelty."' In New York novelty is not
required at all for express contracts, but under Nadel there must be a
showing of novelty to the recipient of the idea for implied-in-fact
contracts.257 While this requirement is easier to meet than the general
novelty formerly mandated by Murray, the Nadel decision also made
clear that some ideas may be so unoriginal that the court will infer
they are "known to every person," including the recipient.2 8
First, both New York and California are correct in their
treatment of express contracts. Novelty should not be required where
there is an explicit agreement. Writers and producers enjoy a wide
freedom of contract, and so may agree to anything they wish. If the
parties desire, they should be able to enter a contract for an old idea
just as easily as a new one. The producer always has the option to
require novelty under the express terms of the contract. If he chooses
not to, and later uses the idea anyway, it would suggest that novelty
does not matter to him.259 The court should not supply a term that the
256. See Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 443; see also Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas:
New York and California are More Than 3,000 Miles Apart, 13 Hastings Comm. & Ent.
L.J. 115, 126 (1990); supra Part III(B).
257. See 208 F.3d at 374; supra Part III(B).
258. 208 F.3d at 378-79; see supra Part Ill(B).
259. See Nimmer on Copyright § 16.08 (citing Donahue, 245 Cal. App. 2d at 613; Fink
v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd., 9 Cal. App. 3d 996 (1970); Korkos v. Toyo Kogyo
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parties did not bargain for. Furthermore, if the producer used the
idea after entering an express contract for its disclosure, one could
infer that it was valuable consideration to him, even if it was not
novel.
For implied-in-fact contracts, however, courts should require
some degree of novelty for an idea to be eligible for legal protection.
There is an important policy reason for such a requirement. ° The law
should not permit a writer to submit a common, frequently used idea,
and then sue for compensation the next time a producer uses it. If this
were allowed, producers could potentially face a landslide of frivolous
litigation - scores of writers would submit broad, general ideas, and
then file suit over the next film or television show that is remotely
similar. Certainly, releases would keep unrepresented writers from
suing, and the Desny test would prevent most of these plaintiffs from
proving a contract existed. But many suits would still be filed, and
some plaintiffs might occasionally win. Thus a novelty requirement is
necessary to stop these lawsuits from even getting inside the
courthouse doors.
The facts of the Murray case provide a good example of all this.
If Murray could submit an idea for a "situation comedy about a
nonstereotypical black family"26' and somehow prove that an implied-
in-fact contract existed, this would set a dangerous precedent. He
might even try to sue over future NBC shows that made use of the
same general idea, such as The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air,262 Amen,263 and
227.264 Other writers would submit similarly vague, non-novel ideas in
hopes that a movie or show fitting such a broad description would
eventually be made, so that they could win a verdict or at least force a
settlement. For instance, someone might submit an idea for a "half-
hour sketch comedy show, like Saturday Night Live,26' but with a
predominantly African-American cast," and then sue over the
Co., 213 U.S.P.Q. 719, 720 (N.D.Ill. 1981)).
260. This discussion generally focuses on the policy concerns, and avoids an in-depth
analysis of whether or not novelty is needed for ideas to be valuable consideration. If
novelty is required, that novelty will prove the idea's value as consideration (as in New
York). If no novelty is required, the disclosure can be the source of consideration (as in
California). Thus, since consideration can be found either way, one should decide whether
or not novelty should be required based on the policy concerns involved.
261. See Murray, 844 F.2d at 995.
262. The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air, (NBC 1990-1.996) (tv series).
263. Amen, (NBC 1986-1991) (tv series).
264. 227, (NBC 1985-1990) (tv series).
265. Saturday Night Live, (NBC 1974-present) (tv series).
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Keenen Ivory Wayans' hit In Living Colo. 26 6 A novelty requirement
would save both producers and the courts a great deal of time and
money, which would otherwise be needed to fight off this kind of
litigation.
Of course, determining that there should be a novelty
requirement does not resolve the issue - one must define exactly what
constitutes a "novel" idea. The dictionary defines "novel" as "new
and not resembling something formerly known or used; original or
striking. 2 67 To be novel in patent law, an invention must be
something "not known to any one before. 2 61 In idea submission cases,
courts have typically used similar definitions.269 As stated in Murray,
"the central issue is the uniqueness of the creation.""27 However, these
definitions present a problem in the story idea context. In some ways,
every story idea is unique. Each one will have different characters,
different settings, and a specific plot that has never been told in that
particular way. On the other hand, few story ideas are ever truly
original. Nearly every film or television program shares some basic
elements of its predecessors, through the use of a similar premise,
stock scenes or characters, or common plot devices. Thus, under these
definitions, it is possible that most story ideas could legitimately be
classified as both novel and non-novel - it all depends on perspective,
on whether one focuses on the broad similarities or the specific
details.
Therefore, when a writer submits a story idea to a studio,
whether or not it is "novel" should turn on the level of detail in the
submission. If the submission is just a vague description of a familiar
premise and some uninteresting characters, it is "nothing more than a
variation on a basic theme"27' and should not be considered novel.
However, if the writer took the same "basic theme" and added some
depth that distinguished it from previous works - by discussing
specific plot points or peculiar character relationships, for instance -
then it should be deemed novel. Under this definition, an idea's
266. In Living Color, (FOX 1990-1994) (tv series).
267. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 795 (10th Ed.).
268. Seaver v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 37 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D.Mass. 1941).
269. See e.g. Nadel, 208 F.3d at 378 ("The determination of whether an idea is
original or novel depends on several factors, including, inter alia, the idea's specificity or
generality (is it a generic concept or one of specific application?), its commonality (how
many people know of this idea?), its uniqueness (how different is this idea from generally
known ideas?), and its commercial availability (how widespread is the idea's use in the
industry?).").
270. 844 F.2d at 993.
271. See AEB & Assoc. Design Group, Inc., 853 F. Supp.at 734.
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novelty would correspond directly with the degree to which the idea
has been developed.
For example, imagine a writer submits an idea for "a time-travel
adventure movie, featuring a eccentric scientist and a teenage boy
who go back in time." This submission should not be held novel,
because it is too general. In fact, it is barely an idea at all - it suggests
a genre, but does not tell much of a story. This is similar to Murray's
idea for a "situation comedy about a nonstereotypical black family."
Now suppose a writer submitted the following idea:
In the year 1985, an eccentric old scientist ("Doc") invents a time
machine out of a DeLorean. One night, Doc invites his friend Marty
(who is in high school) over for a demonstration of his new invention.
But, something goes wrong - and Marty is accidentally sent back in
time to the year 1955. In the process, the time machine runs out of
fuel, stranding Marty in the past. To complicate things further, he
inadvertently prevents his parents from meeting. This change in the
past will seriously affect Marty's future; if he can't get his parents to
fall in love, he will never be born. So, to prevent his existence from
being erased, Marty must figure out a way to get his parents together
in 1955. And even if he succeeds, he still needs to find a way home.
Of course, this is the plot of the popular Michael J. Fox franchise,
Back to the Future.272 As an idea submission, this would appropriately
be considered novel. The added details serve to distinguish it from a
generic "time-travel adventure movie."
This test for novelty would be easy to satisfy - all writers would
have to do is add enough distinctive details to their idea. Essentially,
the only submissions that would be deemed non-novel are those that
are "nothing more than a variation on a basic theme." '273 Any specific,
well-developed story idea would be considered novel. Of course, the
test for novelty should be easy to satisfy. If it were a tougher
standard, requiring a high degree of uniqueness (e.g. "not known to
anyone before"), there would be a risk of leaving many writers
unprotected. Thus, in order to maximize the free flow of ideas and
encourage creativity, the law should impose only a slight burden."4
But, there must be a limit; the law must have a mechanism to keep
the Murrays of the world out of court. Everyone else should be able
to get past the novelty requirement without any trouble, for the real
272. Back to the Future (Universal Pictures 1985) (motion picture).
273. Id.
274. Note that the negative consequences of this novelty requirement are small.
Perhaps some people will refuse to disclose their ideas, but since these ideas would be
non-novel, the social costs to creativity are negligible.
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merits of their case will be tested under the mutual assent, breach,
and preemption branches of idea submission law.
In light of these policy considerations, it seems like California
has made a mistake in not requiring at least a minimal level of novelty
for implied-in-fact contracts. New York's position is more sensible.
Novelty to the recipient is all that is required, which is usually met as
long as the producer had not previously known or used the idea. On
its face, even Murray would pass this test. But, the exception in Nadel
is critical: "an idea may be so unoriginal or lacking in novelty that its
obviousness bespeaks widespread and public knowledge of the idea,
and such knowledge is therefore imputed to the buyer." '275 If applied
appropriately, this language should be sufficient to maintain the type
of novelty requirement described above.
E. "Use" of an Idea
Further issues arise concerning the breach of story idea
contracts. For an idea contract to be breached, the producer must
have actually used the writer's idea in one of his projects. Usually
there is no express contract that explicitly defines "use," and direct
evidence of use is rare. As a result, it is typically up to the court to
decide whether or not the writer's idea was actually used. Under
current law, courts infer use of an idea from evidence of access and
similarity. Consequently, it is necessary to determine just how much
similarity should be required in order to find a breach.
Of course, since similarity is very intangible, it would be
impossible to arrive at a bright-line rule. It is too difficult to measure
in practical, easily quantifiable terms. Inevitably a court's inquiry into
similarity will be heavily fact-specific, and the result may ultimately
hinge on the judge's instinct and gut feeling about the material. Thus,
the law cannot attempt to develop a standard with any precision; it
can only provide a general guide for courts to follow. Accordingly,
this has translated into a choice between two broad standards:
ordinary "similarity"276 or the more demanding "substantial
similarity., 277 Because of the fact-specific nature of the similarity
275. 208 F.3d at 378.
276. For cases employing the "similarity" standard, consult Weitzenkorn, 40 Cal. 2d
at 792 (breach occurs "no matter how slight or commonplace the portion which they
used."); Buchwald, supra n. 23, at *9 ("liability in a contract case can arise even if a
nonsubstantial element is copied"); Donahue, 245 Cal. App. 2d 593; Minniear, 266 Cal.
App. 2d at 504, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 294; see generally Nimmer on Copyright, § 16.05 n. 58.
277. For cases employing the "substantial similarity" standard, see Henried v. Four
Star Television, 266 Cal. App. 2d 435, 436 (1968); Whitfield, 751 F.2d at 93-94; Kurlan, 40
Cal. 2d at 809; Sutton v. Walt Disney Prods., 118 Cal. App. 2d 598, 603 (1953).
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inquiry, deciding which standard to use is equivalent to deciding who
will receive the benefit of the doubt. If basic "similarity" is used, the
writer will have to prove fewer common elements to support an
inference of actual use. On the other hand, if "substantial similarity"
is used, then the writer's burden is higher and the producer has an
advantage. This issue has never been fully settled. Over time, courts
have used both standards in idea submission cases.278
From a policy perspective, using "substantial similarity" is the
better approach. As discussed earlier with respect to novelty, many
story ideas can be construed as "similar" if viewed broadly. A court
should be fairly certain that a writer's idea was actually used, and so
producers should get the benefit of the doubt under the standard. Of
course, "substantial similarity" does not require an exact match
between the idea and the finished product. Surely, there will be
differences in characters, setting, scenes, and perhaps even a different
ending. But, the two works must have more in common besides the
same basic premise, or else there would be insufficient protection of
producers.9 Simply sharing a premise should not be enough to
breach the contract; instead, the court should require a close
resemblance in the overall plot and storyline °.2 Therefore, the
ambiguity in the standard should slightly favor the producer. In the
end, though, application of the "substantial similarity" standard
would depend heavily on the facts of each particular case. Because
the standard is so imprecise, it is possible that its exact formulation is
unimportant. There is a real chance that judges would reach the same
results, regardless of whether they used ordinary "similarity" or
"substantial similarity" as their guide.
Finally, it is interesting to note that a novelty requirement would
assist courts in deciding whether or not a producer has used a writer's
idea.' If an idea submission is novel, this would tend to suggest that
the defendant actually used the submission, though this is subject to
278. See generally Nimmer on Copyright.
279. This would be especially true if the courts were to modify the Desny test and
imply a contract whenever a producer accepts an idea without a release, as suggested. Any
reduction in the plaintiff's burden to prove contract formation should be offset by making
him show slightly more similarity in order to prove that his idea was actually used.
280. See Minniear, 266 Cal. App. 2d at 505, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 294 ("An underwater
adventure series, like a cowboy adventure series, has certain basic similarities which
cannot be avoided. However, there are enough similarities in basic plot ideas, themes,
sequences, and dramatic 'gimmicks' between 'Sea Divers' and 'Sea Hunt' for a jury to
infer that appellant's ideas and format were the inspiration for 'Sea Hunt."').
281. See Sobel, supra n. 95, at 62-63 (citing Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d 470).
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rebuttal by a defense of independent creation.282. Conversely, if an
idea is non-novel, the defendant could argue that he already knew of
it, and hence did not use the plaintiff's submission."' If courts adopted
the novelty requirement recommended above - which judges an
idea's novelty on its level of depth and detail - it too would also help
in determining breach. The law would encourage writers to include
more details in their submissions; in turn, this would provide the
courts with more elements to compare when assessing the similarity
between the idea and the completed work.
F. Preemption by Copyright Law
Perhaps the most important issue in the law of ideas, however, is
the preemption of idea submission claims by federal copyright law.
The present trend is favoring preemption," and critics believe that
this trend could be "the death knell to idea submission cases."'2 85
Recall the test for preemption, which is governed by section 301 of
the Copyright Act.286 The first prong is whether or not "the subject
matter of the claim comes within the subject matter of the Copyright
Act."287 Second, the court must determine "whether the rights
protected by the state law claim are the equivalent of any of the
exclusive rights protected by the federal Copyright Act."'2 8 As this
statute is currently written, implied-in-fact contract claims for story
ideas should never be preempted.
First of all, it seems that Judge Easterbrook's ProCD opinion
was correct in holding that the rights of a contractual idea submission
claim are not "equivalent" to the rights protected by copyright.2"9 By
their nature, contract rights are inherently different from copyright
rights. A contract is onlyenforceable against the parties, while a
copyright grants the holder a monopoly against the world.2 9 If a
producer and a writer form a contract for a story idea, everyone else
is free to use the idea as they please; however, if a writer obtains a
copyright, he thereby "withdraws the idea from general
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Fischer v. Viacom Intl., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D.Md. 2000); Selby, 96 F.
Supp. 2d 1053; Endemol Entertainment, 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1524; see also Kulik, supra
n. 195, at 2.
285. See Selby, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 n. 8; see also Kulik, supra n. 195, at 3.
286. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
287. Id. § 301; see also Del Madera Properties, 820 F.2d at 976-77; supra Part III(D).
288. Id. § 301; see also Del Madera Properties, 820 F.2d at 976-77; supra Part III(D).
289. 86 F.3d at 1454.
290. Id.
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circulation."'2 9t Moreover, contracts have the "extra element" of a
promise.2 92 It strains logic to call these "equivalent" rights.
However, one need not even reach the equivalence prong -
based on the "subject matter" prong alone, one must conclude that
story idea contract claims should never be preempted under §301.
Most courts find that this prong is easily satisfied, but this is an error.
The subject matter of an idea submission claim is obviously the idea
itself. The subject of matter of copyright is clearly expressed in
section 102 of the Copyright Act, and it explicitly excludes ideas.9
Thus, it seems ludicrous for a court to hold that "the subject matter of
the [contract] claim comes within the subject matter of the Copyright
Act." By definition, the two are mutually exclusive. Any finding to
the contrary seems to go against the plain language of the statute.
But courts are prepared to defend their position. They refer to
the oft-cited Berge case from the Fourth Circuit, which said: "the
shadow actually cast by the Act's preemption is notably broader than
the wing of its protection."'2 94 Essentially, this means that it is possible
for the Copyright Act to preempt claims involving subject matter (i.e.,
ideas) that it does not protect. This may be acceptable in cases where
the ideas are embodied in a fully copyrightable work, for the writer
could still sue for copyright infringement. However, in other cases,
this could lead to anomalous results. For example, suppose a writer
submits a story idea in the form of a brief outline, which is not eligible
for copyright protection. Imagine that an implied-in-fact contract is
formed, and that the producer uses the idea for a film. The writer
then sues for breach of contract, and the producer argues that the
contract claim is preempted by section 301. Under Berge, the claim
would be preempted; even though ideas are not within the subject
matter of copyright for purposes of protection, they are for the
purposes of preemption. But this would leave the writer without any
remedy whatsoever - since he had only submitted a non-
copyrightable outline, he would unable to sue for copyright
infringement. Thus, in all cases where the submission itself does not
qualify for copyright, a writer's idea would be wholly unprotected.
This cannot be the law. As discussed earlier, there are many
reasons why ideas need to be protected, even when they are
expressed in non-copyrightable form. Yet, decisions like Berge and
291. See Rokos, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 614,227 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
292. See supra Part 111(D).
293. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
294. 104 F.3d at 1463.
295. 17 U.S.C. § 301; supra Part 111(D).
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Selby leave writers vulnerable. If a writer completes a copyrightable
script, his contract claim is preempted, and he can only sue for
copyright infringement - a producer is free to steal his underlying
ideas with impunity. If a writer submits a non-copyrightable
treatment or outline, his contract claim is still preempted, but he has
nowhere else to turn. Hence, if the Berge rationale continues to
govern, it could indeed signal the demise of the law of ideas.
For these reasons, a contract claim involving ideas should not be
preempted under section 301. However, there are legitimate purposes
served by copyright preemption, and they should not be dismissed
lightly. When Congress passed section 301, the goal was to establish
national uniformity under the federal statute.296 To achieve this,
Congress needed to abolish the state doctrines of "common law
copyright," in order to prevent states from granting rights equivalent
to those found in the Copyright Act.297 Plaintiffs should not be able to
do an "end run" around federal copyright law by suing on an identical
state theory.298 Therefore, if a state law claim is essentially a copyright
claim in disguise, it should be preempted in the interest of uniformity
- even if it is based on a contract.2 99 The Selby court pointed this out
with their insightful hypothetical:
Suppose... the defendant promised "I will not infringe any
copyright or copyright protection in the script you are
proposing to show me." In that case, the very promise is so
inextricably entwined with the copyright that to permit the
promisee to sue upon it would undermine the preemption
feature of the Copyright Act.3"
However, idea submission claims can never be disguised
copyright claims. The nature of the harm is different - the alleged
promise being sued on is not "I promise not to infringe your
copyright," but "I promise to pay if I use your idea." If it were the
former, then it would be a contract for the writer's expression, which
would clearly be "within the subject matter of the Copyright Act" and
should be preempted. But, these contracts are for the ideas
themselves, not for the expression of the ideas. It is possible for a
producer to breach an idea contract without infringing the writer's
copyright. Thus, an idea submission plaintiff is not trying to do an
296. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-
1476 (1976)).
297. Id.
298. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447.
299. See 17 U.S.C. §301 (Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-
1476 (1976)).
300. See Selby, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1060; supra Part I1(D).
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"end run" around copyright law - he is simply suing for a different
wrong. If courts continue to erroneously preempt these claims under
§301, this wrong will have no remedy.
V
Conclusion
Mark Dunn and Paramount Pictures eventually settled their
lawsuit over The Truman Show.0 It is difficult to know for certain
how a court would have resolved the idea submission claim presented
in the case. Under current law, though, it is likely that Dunn would
have lost. First, he would have needed to prove that an implied-in-
fact contract was formed with Paramount when he submitted the
script for Frank's Life in the summer of 1992. Under Desny, this
would require that Paramount accepted his script after Dunn had
"clearly conditioned" his disclosure on a promise to pay. Dunn could
argue that Paramount knew this condition because it was presented
through an agent, and was already in commercial release as a play. If
the court construed Desny strictly, though, this argument might be
rejected. They might require a more explicit demand for
compensation, like the one in Desny itself. Second, there would be no
problem with novelty. If California law was applied, there would be
no novelty requirement at all. If New York law applied, Nadel would
have controlled. The idea for Frank's Life was definitely novel to
Paramount at the time they received it, for they did not obtain
Truman from Andrew Niccol until over a year later. Frank's Life
probably would have even satisfied Murray's more stringent
requirement of general novelty.
The factual heart of this case would have been the third issue,
breach. Even if Dunn could prove that an implied-in-fact contract
existed, he would have needed to demonstrate that Paramount
actually used his idea submission in the making of The Truman Show.
Paramount would likely first argue that no one in a decision-making
position had "access" to Dunn's play. According to one studio
official, the play was rejected by a low-level staff member."2 To
counter this, Dunn could argue that Paramount did possess his script,
so anyone may have seen it. Furthermore, someone may have seen
301. According to Dunn's attorney, Carl Person, the terms of the settlement are
confidential.
302. See David Rohde, Writer Accuses the Producers of 'Truman,' N.Y. Times Section
B, p. 5 (June 17, 1998).
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the review in the New York Post,3"3 and producer Scott Rudin was
even invited to a performance of the play. Next, Paramount would
contend that there are not enough similarities to support an inference
of use. However, based on the allegations contained in the complaint,
the similarities do appear to be substantial."° Finally, Paramount
would argue the defense of independent creation. Based on Niccol's
1991 letters to his manager,"' they can claim that Niccol came up with
the idea on his own. Assuming these letters are genuine, they could
be the decisive facts - for if Frank's Life was not used in the making
of Truman, there could be no breach of contract.
Ultimately, though, there is a good possibility the court would
never reach the issues of formation, novelty, and breach. Under the
rationale of cases like Berge and Selby, Dunn's idea submission claim
might have been dismissed at the outset, on the grounds that it is
preempted by the Copyright Act. Dunn, of course, did sue for
copyright infringement, because his submission was a fully
copyrighted script. But his abstract idea - the story of a man who is
unaware that his life is a television show - would find no protection in
the law.
Now suppose that courts adopt the recommendations discussed
above. This would radically change the law governing idea submission
claims, and it might affect the outcome of Dunn v. Paramount
Pictures. First, and perhaps most importantly, Dunn's contract claim
would not be preempted. If §301 is properly interpreted, no story idea
contract should ever be preempted, for their "subject matter" is
distinct from that of copyright. Second, Dunn would easily be able to
prove contract formation. Under the proposed modification of the
Desny test, an implied-in-fact contract would have been formed when
Paramount accepted the script for Frank's Life. The play was
submitted by an agent, so the studio was clearly put on notice that
Dunn expected compensation if his idea was used. Since no release
was used, Paramount was implicitly assenting to the agreement. As
before, novelty would be a non-issue. Frank's Life has enough details
to definitely satisfy the minimal novelty requirement suggested; the
idea was developed into a full-length script. Finally, the same factual
issues regarding breach would remain. Though there seems to be
"substantial similarity" between Frank's Life and The Truman Show,
the validity of the access and independent creation defenses would
303. Id.
304. See supra n. 41.
305. See supra Part I.
20021 RETHINKING THE LAW OF STORY IDEAS
have to be determined by a jury. Thus, putting the factual issues
aside, the analysis of Dunn's case would be significantly different if
these changes were enacted. If there were no evidence of potential
independent creation, they might even make the difference between
Dunn winning and losing.
In sum, it is clear that the proposed changes would greatly
increase the legal protection of ideas. They would eliminate the
formidable obstacles currently imposed by federal preemption and
the Desny test, allowing more plaintiffs to have their day in court.
This would establish a regime that gives many writers the incentive to
submit ideas, without having to fear that they will be stolen. At the
same time, the proposed changes would maintain adequate
safeguards for the interests of producers. By continuing to enforce
releases, there would be no threat of frivolous litigation over
unsolicited ideas. The novelty requirement would also act as a filter.
The standard for determining breach would be slightly stiffer, and
contains enough judicial discretion so that the judge can screen out
claims that lack merit.
These changes might lead to more extensive use of express
contracts for ideas. If producers knew that contracts were going to be
implied, they may be inclined to make their terms explicit to
maximize their control over the agreement. This would be beneficial
to all involved. Writers would have solid proof of the producer's
promise to pay, the contract would clearly set forth the degree of
novelty required, and the parties can agree on what constitutes "use"
of an idea."6 Courts would have a roadmap to follow in deciding idea
submission cases, instead of having to imply everything. More
importantly, the use of express contracts would likely result in more
writers actually being compensated for their ideas, so there would no
need for lawsuits in the first place.
In the end, the continued success of both the film and television
industries depends on maximizing the free flow of creativity. After all,
Hollywood is in the business of buying and selling ideas. The court in
Desny said it best: "ideas are as free as the air .... but there can be
circumstances when neither air nor ideas may be acquired without
cost.""3 7 It is up to the law, guided by reason and prudent social policy,
to determine precisely what these circumstances are. There is little
306. Of course, the terms of these express contracts would reflect the disparity in
bargaining power between writers and producers. However, there is only so far that the
definitions of "novelty" and "use" can be stretched. Also, if this did become a problem,
courts could always declare the troubling contractual terms to be unconscionable.
307. 46 Cal. 2d at 731.
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room for error; the wrong level of protection could result in many
writers refusing to submit ideas or producers refusing to accept them.
It is critical that the law guard against this - for a lack of ideas, just
like a lack of air, would pose a dangerous threat to the survival of
Hollywood.
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